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Economic Institutions and FDI Location Choice:
Evidence from U.S. Multinationals in China
Abstract: This paper examines the impacts of economic institutions, in-
cluding property rights protection and contract enforcement, on the location
choice of foreign direct investment. From a data set of 6,288 U.S. multina-
tionals investing in various China’s regions for the period of 1993-2001, it
is found that U.S. multinationals prefer to invest in those regions that have
better protection of intellectual property rights, lower degree of government
intervention in business operations, lower level of government corruption,
and better contract enforcement. Our results are robust to alternative mea-
sures of economic institutions, and to the inclusion of control variables such
as those for agglomeration economies, and other traditional factors of FDI
location choice.
1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the driving forces behind the de-
velopment of transition economies. China provides an example. Since 1978,
it has attracted more than US$500 billion foreign direct investment (China
Statistical Yearbook, 2005), and the World Bank (1997) has credited FDI as
a key factor to China’s economic growth during this period. This is why those
transition economies give top priority to attracting FDI and show tremen-
dous interests in understanding what helps lure FDI. Like any investment,
the incentive for multinationals to invest in those transition economies de-
pends on their expected returns. In transition economies, investment returns
depend critically on the protection of property rights (the vertical relations
between the state and owners of private properties) and contract enforcement
(the horizontal relations between transacting parties), the two of which are
referred to as economic institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Thus,
an important research question is to investigate the impacts of economic
institutions on foreign direct investment.
In recent years, there emerges an important literature about the im-
pacts of economic institutions on investment incentives and economic per-
formance.1 The studies of the impact of economic institutions on FDI flows
are, however, rather limited. In a cross-country study using bilateral FDI
1See, among others, Besley (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), Mauro (1995), Hall
and Jones (1999), La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002). For a brief review, please read Pande and Udry
(2005).
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flows data, Wei (2000a, 2000b) finds that corruption in a host country sub-
stantially deters inward FDI. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) use an aggregate
panel data set for twenty-five transition economies from Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union to show that institutions, mainly reflected in rule
of law and quality of bureaucracy, are an important determinant of FDI
flows. Such cross-country studies have diﬃculties controlling for the impacts
of political system, culture and language, corporate tax policies, and national
trade and investment policies that could vary dramatically across countries.
Furthermore, the use of aggregated FDI flows as some of the cross-country
studies did makes it impossible to control for the identity of foreign investors,
which may interact with the economic institutions of the host countries. To
overcome these two issues, in this paper, we study the impacts of economic
institutions on FDI location choice made by U.S. multinationals in China’s
various regions.
China is a unitary state with uniform de jure laws across the country.
However, China is characterized by substantial regional disparity in economic
institutions, i.e., the de facto property rights protection and contract enforce-
ment exhibit wide variations across regions. In this sense, examining the
cross-region variation in economic institutions in China allows us to conduct
a natural experiment to focus on the de facto law enforcement after holding
constant the de jure legal codes. This certainly oﬀers a better setting to
distinguish between legal codes and law enforcement than the cross-country
analysis does. Meanwhile, the United States (U.S.) is the third largest FDI
source country/region in China after Hong Kong and Taiwan. Compared
with Hong Kong and Taiwan, investment from the U.S. is viewed as "truly
foreign" in nature, because Hong Kong and Taiwan are ethnically Chinese
economies and some of the investment from these two economies are origi-
nated from mainland China for tax and other reasons (so-called round-trip
FDI). More importantly, FDI from the U.S. could be particularly vulnerable
to weak economic institutions because of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act that prohibits U.S. multinationals from bribing local oﬃcials in overseas
investment (Bardhan, 1997). Hence, it is ideal to use FDI from the U.S. to
explore the eﬀects of economic institutions on FDI.
Specifically, we construct indices for property rights protection (includ-
ing the extent of intellectual property rights protection, the degree of gov-
ernment intervention in business operations, and the level of government
corruption) and contract enforcement (the eﬀectiveness of courts in dispute
resolution).Three of these indices are based on a survey of private enterprises
in China. Unlike state-owned or collectively-owned enterprises under the
auspices of governments, private enterprises have to fight for survival and
growth by themselves. Their views of the role played by governments in en-
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suring a reasonable business environment could reflect the reality to a large
extent. We employ the discrete choice model developed by McFadden (1974)
to examine the impacts of economic institutions on FDI location choice made
by 6,288 U.S. multinationals investing in various regions in China for the pe-
riod of 1993-2001. Our empirical analysis shows that regions with stronger
economic institutions are more likely to attract U.S.-based multinational en-
terprises (MNEs) to set up business operations in those regions.
There is a large literature on the determinants of FDI location choice,
including wage costs, infrastructure, and market potential. An important
focus of this literature is about the eﬀect of agglomeration on FDI location
choice. For example, Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) show that there do exist
agglomeration eﬀects of Japanese manufacturing firms in the United States.2
There is also a large literature on FDI location choice in China. Belderbos
and Carree (2002), Fung, Iizaka and Parker (2002), and Fung, Iizaka and Siu
(2003) examine a host of traditional FDI location determinants. Head and
Ries (1996), Cheng and Kwan (2000), He (2002), Chang and Park (2005),
and Amiti and Javorcki (2007) focus on the eﬀects of agglomeration in FDI
location choice in China. The focus of our paper is on the impacts of eco-
nomic institutions on FDI location choice. Our main results are still robust,
even after controlling for the agglomeration eﬀect and other traditional de-
terminants of FDI location choice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Data and variables are de-
scribed in Section 2. Empirical estimation strategy and results are discussed
in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data and Variables
2.1 Data
The largest source countries/regions of FDI to China are Hong Kong, Taiwan,
United States, Japan and South Korea in descending order. Though Hong
Kong and Taiwan claim the largest shares of FDI to the Chinese mainland,
they are ethnically Chinese economies, and FDI from these two regions may
not be representative of FDI in general. Meanwhile, Japan and Korea are
geographically close to China, and they even share some similar cultural
heritage with China. In this sense, even FIEs from Japan and Korea are
not "truly foreign" enough. Thus, U.S. is the largest "truly foreign" source
2There is also evidence for agglomeration eﬀect in FDI from data of other countries,
such as Portugal by Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000), France by Crozet,
Mayer and Mucchielli (2004), and Hungury by Boudier-Bensebaa (2005).
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country of FDI to China. Thus, in this study, we focus on the location choice
of foreign direct investment by U.S. investors in China.
Our data come from a survey of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) set
up by U.S. investors in China. The survey was conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China in 2001. There are altogether 13,290 U.S.-FIEs
in the sample, accounting for around 75% of the total number of U.S.-FIEs
operating in China in 2001 as reported by China Statistical Yearbook 2002.
After deleting those U.S.-FIEs without registration dates, we have 13,270
firms. As the location choice of service firms could be qualitatively diﬀerent
from that of manufacturing firms, we confine our analysis to the subsample
of manufacturing firms set up by U.S. investors. The dataset specifies the
type of investors as either individuals or companies. We focus on the FDI
location choice of U.S. companies in China because the behavior of individual
investors could be quite diﬀerent from that of multinationals. Furthermore,
we notice that a majority of U.S. individual investors are Chinese Americans
who, under most circumstances, take advantage of their cultural aﬃnity with
China to set up small-scale FIEs in the Chinese mainland. This situation is
much less likely for FIEs set up by U.S. companies.
After restricting our study to manufacturing firms and deleting those FIEs
established by individual U.S. investors, we are left with a sample of 7,521
U.S. firms. The registration dates of these firms span from 1982 (4 years
after China started its economic reform) to 2001 (the sample year). Table 1
lists the annual number of FIEs newly established by U.S. multinationals by
the year of registration from 1982 to 2001. It is clear that the FDI flow from
the U.S. into China has increased dramatically only since 1992. Because
the data for constructing the indicators of economic institutions are only
available after 1993, we further restrict our analysis to those FIEs set up
by U.S. multinationals during 1993-2001, and end up with a final sample
of 6,288 U.S.-FIEs. This sample period captures the majority of U.S.-FIEs
engaged in manufacturing industries.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of manufacturing FIEs by U.S. multina-
tionals across 29 diﬀerent regions in China. A brief look at this table shows
that the inward FDI flow from the U.S. is mainly concentrated in the coastal
regions: Jiangsu, Shanghai, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Guangdong claim the
largest numbers of manufacturing U.S.-FIEs in descending order, while in-
land regions such as Qinghai, Ningxia, Hainan, Guizhou, and Gansu have the
smallest numbers of manufacturing FIEs in ascending order.3 The dependent
variable for our analysis is the location choice by U.S. multinationals during
3Tibet has received no investment from U.S. multinationals during the sample period,
and is excluded in our conditional logit analysis.
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the sample period of 1993-2001.
2.2 Variables
At least since Smith (1776), the economics profession has reached a con-
sensus: One of the government’s most important responsibilities to ensure a
well-functioning market economy is to protect property rights and maintain a
secure contracting environment. Thus, our measures of economic institutions
are about property rights protection and contract enforcement.
2.2.1 Property Rights Protection
Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Unlike some of the other transition economies, China did not have formal
protection of private properties until fairly recently. However, various reg-
ulations and rules help maintain a reasonable level of protection for private
properties, and the level of protection diﬀers from one region to another.
Thus, our measure of property rights protection intensively reflects the de
facto property rights protection across China’s regions. We use the protec-
tion of intellectual properties to measure property rights protection. This is
ideal not only because we can rely on the quantifiable patent data in gaug-
ing intellectual property rights protection but also because it reflects the
central concern of U.S. FIEs. Unlike small- and medium-sized FIEs from
ethnically Chinese economies like Hong Kong and Taiwan, multinationals
from the United States are typically large companies equipped with modern
technologies. This is consistent with the importance of intellectual prop-
erty in the American economy. According to Israel (2006), industries with
significant intellectual properties account for over half of all U.S. exports;
intellectual property accounts for over 1/3 of the value of all U.S. corpora-
tions, and represents 40% of U.S. economic growth. It is thus not surprising
that FIEs from the United States are particularly concerned with intellectual
property rights protection.
In recent years, the rising tide of counterfeiting and piracy in China has
posed an enormous threat to U.S. business interests. In a 2005 survey of
the U.S.-China Business Council, members put enforcement of intellectual
property rights protection at the very top on their list of concerns. The seri-
ous intellectual property infringement in China reflects the lack of proactive
and deterrent intellectual property enforcement, especially at the local level
(Israel, 2006; Stratford, 2006). Depending on the diﬀerence in government
coordination capacity, corruption, staﬀ training and legal enforcement power
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across regions, the degree of intellectual property rights protection also ex-
hibits large variation from region to region.
We use the logarithm of the number of approved patents per capita (avail-
able from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues) as a measure of in-
tellectual property rights protection. Though patent number could be an
outcome of research and development capacity and inputs, human capital
endowment and other factors in various regions, property rights protection
provided by regional governments no doubt plays an important role. For
example, Guangdong has a lower level of education achievements in terms of
both the proportion of people enrolled in higher-education institutions and
that having higher education degrees than many other regions such as Jilin
and Heilongjiang, but the number of patents per capita in Guangdong is much
higher than that in these two Northeastern regions. To further relieve the
potential concern about whether the number of patents per capita mainly re-
flects regional human capital endowments, we control for the education level
in various regions in China in our regression analysis.
Intellectual property rights protection varies substantially across the coun-
try. As shown in Table 3, Beijing has the highest number of patents per
capita, followed by Shanghai and Guangdong, whereas Gansu has the lowest
number of patents per capita and followed by Guizhou and Qinghai.
For robustness check, we use an alternative measure of intellectual prop-
erty rights protection, which is a sub-index of the China Regional Marke-
tization Indices developed by Fan, Wang and Zhu (2003). This index is
constructed by combining two ratios. One is the ratio of the number of ap-
plications for various types of patent to GDP, and the other is the ratio of
the number of various types of approved patent applications to GDP. Since
the compilation of the Fan-Wang-Zhu index started as late as 1997, we have
to restrict our analysis to the subsample of the period 1998-2001 when using
this alternative index of intellectual property rights protection.
Government Intervention in Business Operations
The second variable for property rights protection concerns the degree of
Government Intervention in Business Operations, constructed based on data
from the survey of China’s Private Enterprises 1995-2002.4 In the survey,
there is a question about whether private entrepreneurs would go and ask
for government help when they encounter business disputes, and the variable
Government Intervention in Business Operations is defined as the proportion
4This survey was conduced by the United Front Work Department of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce
Federation, and the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, in 1995, 1997, 2000, and 2002.
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of entrepreneurs requesting government help in case of business disputes.
This index exhibits wide variation across regions. For example, in terms
of level of economic development, the six regions of Beijing, Guangdong,
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang are at similar level, but they diﬀer
substantially in terms of government intervention. Beijing, Jiangsu, Tianjin
and Zhejiang have a score of about 0.10 and 0.11, Shanghai has a value of
0.07, whereas Guangdong has 0.05 that is only about half of that for Beijing
etc. For more information on the variation of this index across China’s
regions, please read Table 3.
Government intervention in business operations could be indicative of
either strong or weak protection of private properties. On the one hand,
government help may fill the void created by the lack or weakness of the
court system. That is to say, government intervention is a second-best so-
lution to the lack of formal protection of private properties. If this is the
case, U.S. multinationals may find government help in business operations
an appealing feature of China’s regional governments. On the other hand,
government help may lead to rent-seeking and even corruption: entrepre-
neurs lobby or bribe government oﬃcials to seek favor in resolving business
disputes. This becomes the grabbing hand of the government (Frye and
Shleifer 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). Faced with the hand-binding law
against bribing local government oﬃcials, however, the U.S. multinationals
cannot enjoy the benefits of government intervention but have to bear the
costs of other firms getting advantages of government help. Thus, U.S. multi-
nationals are particularly disadvantaged in a region where there is significant
government intervention in business operations.
Again, for robustness check, we use an alternative index of government
interference with enterprises, a sub-index in Fan-Wang-Zhu’s China Regional
Marketization Indices. It is constructed on the basis of the percentage of
time the enterprise managers have spent dealing with government agencies
and oﬃcials.
Government Corruption
China’s economic reform has been accompanied by the rampant corrup-
tion over the past three decades. The extensive state control of and state
intervention in the national economy, the lack of democracy and freedom of
media, the weak rule of law, etc. have contributed to the severe corruption
problem. As U.S. multinationals are constrained by legal prohibition against
bribery in foreign countries, we expect that they are particularly vulnerable
to government corruption. Government corruption, however, varies across
China’s regions, which provides us an opportunity to test the impacts of the
severity of government corruption on FDI by U.S. multinationals.
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From the same survey of China’s Private Enterprises, we construct an in-
dicator of the degree of Government Corruption in China’s diﬀerent regions.
It is the proportion of private entrepreneurs answering "Yes" to the question:
is it necessary to have stricter policies against government corruption in your
region?5 As shown in Table 3, Guizhou has the highest degree of government
corruption, followed by Hainan and Jilin, while Shanghai enjoys the lowest
degree of government corruption followed by Hubei and Jiangsu. Like the
cross-country corruption indices such as those constructed by Business Inter-
national, Transparency International or International Country Risk Guide,
our cross-region corruption measure for China is a subjective survey-based
index based on entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the severity of corruption.
2.2.2 Contract Enforcement
Contract enforcement hinges on legal institutions and law enforcement. While
China has had commercial laws on paper since the early stage of its economic
reform, the quality of legal institutions and the degree of law enforcement,
however, vary significantly across regions. A comprehensive indicator of the
eﬀectiveness of contract enforcement is the willingness to use courts in re-
solving business disputes. From the survey of China’s Private Enterprises,
we construct a measure of Contract Enforcement in China’s various regions.
It is the proportion of private entrepreneurs answering aﬃrmatively to the
question: will you use courts to resolve business disputes? This index also
exhibits large variation across regions. For instance, as shown in Table 3,
some neighboring regions in North China, i.e., Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and
Shanxi, exhibit large variation in the value of this index, having 0.24, 0.17,
0.22 and 0.10 respectively. For an illustration of this variable for year 2000
across China’s regions, please read Table 3.
In Fan-Wang-Zhu’s (2003) China Regional Marketization Indices, there
is a sub-index on legal institutions and contract enforcement. It is the pro-
portion of lawyers in a region’s total population. We use it as an alterna-
tive measure of contract enforcement in our robustness analysis. Again, our
analysis will be restricted to the subsample of 1998-2001 when this variable
is used, for it is available only after 1997.
5Because the question on the degree of government corruption was introduced only after
the 1997 survey, our analysis using the "Government Corruption" index will be restricted
to the subsample of the period 1998-2001.
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2.2.3 Other Variables
While our focus is on the impacts of economic institutions on FDI location
choice made by U.S. multinationals, we also control for a list of other factors
that have been found to be important in the literature. The most important
one is agglomeration eﬀect, including both horizontal and vertical agglomer-
ation.
The growing literature on new economic geography focuses on knowledge
spillover as the potential benefits of horizontal agglomeration (Krugman,
1991; Porter, 1998). On the other hand, agglomeration could also gener-
ate negative externalities. A firm’s own knowledge and technologies can be
transferred to rival firms to its disadvantages. Agglomeration may also give
rise to intensified competition in both product markets and input markets
among adjacently located firms.
The new economic geography theories also highlight the role of backward
and forward linkages, as they promote complementarities and cooperation
among firms of related production stages. The concentration of upstream
firms indicates the accessibility to component suppliers in the region, whereas
the concentration of downstream firms and final goods consumers shows the
accessibility to market in the regions (Krugman and Venables, 1995; Ven-
ables, 1996; Duranton and Puga, 2004). Therefore producers typically like
to choose locations that have good access to large markets and to suppliers of
intermediate inputs. It should be pointed out that the horizontal and vertical
agglomeration are often bundled together (Fujita, Krugman and Venables,
2001).
Agglomeration
Horizontal agglomeration is measured by the ratio of the number of firms
in the same region and same 4-digit industry to the national total of the
same 4-digit industry. Here we diﬀerentiate two types of horizontal agglom-
eration: the agglomeration of U.S. multinationals which is constructed based
on the 2001 Survey of Foreign Invested Enterprises, and the agglomeration
of China’s indigenous firms based on the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms
by China’s National Bureau of Statistics.
Agglomeration_USirt =
Number_USirt
Number_USit
Agglomeration_Domesticirt =
Number_Domesticirt
Number_Domesticit
where i represents industry, r denotes region and t indicates year.6
6Here we follow Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) in considering the degree of horizontal
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For a given 4-digit industry and a given region, the degree of vertical
agglomeration is measured by the concentration of upstream or downstream
firms in the same region, weighted by the degree of linkages between the in-
dustry and those upstream or downstream industries. Specifically the back-
ward (i.e., upstream industries) and forward (i.e., downstream industries)
agglomerations are defined as
Backwardirt = Σ
j
αij
Number_domesticjrt
Number_domesticjt
Forwardirt = Σ
j
βij
Number_domesticjrt
Number_domesticjt
+ βiC
GDPrt
GDPt
where αij is the input-output ratio reflecting the inputs from the upstream
industry j required for one unit of output of industry i; βij is the input-
output ratio showing the input made by industry i required for one unit of
output of downstream industry j; and βiC
GDPrt
GDPt
indicates the proportion of
final demand for industry i’s output by region r in the total final demand by
the whole country.7 The data used for constructing the indices for vertical
agglomeration come from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms by China’s
National Bureau of Statistics and the 1997 Input-Output Table of China.8
Other Regional Characteristics as Control Variables
We follow the literature on FDI location choice to control for the following
factors in regression analysis.
(1)Wages. Low production costs mainly reflected in low wages are widely
regarded as an advantage of China in attracting foreign manufacturing firms.
To see how the regional diﬀerentiation in wage costs aﬀects FDI distribution,
we include in our analysis the average manufacturing wages in each region.9
(2) Infrastructure. It is widely reported in the literature that regions
with superior transportation facilities are more appealing to FIEs. We use
highway density, i.e., the length of highway per square kilometer in a region,
as an indicator of infrastructure adequacy.
agglomeration of both indigenous firms and firms from the same source country.
7Here we employ regional GDP to proxy for market demand and use the ratio of
regional GDP to national GDP to indicate the share of final demand accounted for by
some particular region.
8Our backward and forward agglomeration indicators are similar in nature to the sup-
plier access and market access measures respectively adopted in Amiti and Javorcki (2007).
In their work, industry output is used to gauge the market access and supplier access, while
we use the number of firms instead because of data limitation. They have also consider
the eﬀect of distance on the impacts of agglomeration economies.
9Data sources for the five variables are listed in the Appendix A1.
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(3) Education. The average human capital level of the workforce could be
an important determinant of FDI location for U.S. multinationals, as they
tend to be engaged in technology-intensive industries. We therefore use the
proportion of the number of students enrolled in higher education institutions
in a region to its total population as a proxy for the average level of human
capital in the region.
(4) Presence of U.S. embassy or consulates. The United States has its
embassy in Beijing, and consulates in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai and
Shenyang. U.S. embassy and consulates could play an important role in fa-
cilitating information transmission to U.S. multinationals regarding national
and regional situations, which could help them overcome various informa-
tional and cultural barriers to making investments in China. We therefore
include a dummy variable taking value one if there is U.S. embassy or con-
sulate in a region and zero otherwise.
(5) Government promotion policies. The Chinese central government and
the local governments at various levels set up a large variety of promotion
policies to attract FDI. One important aspect of these promotion policies
is establishing diﬀerent types of special development zones. At the national
level, the central government set up four special economic zones and fourteen
open coastal cities in the 1980s. Later, the central government established
various national-level economic and technological development zones in many
cities in various regions. These areas are granted various types of preferen-
tial policies (like preferential tax policy) by the central government and are
allowed to have deals with FIEs flexibly. At the same time, the provincial
and the municipal governments have also established numerous provincial- or
local-level economic and technological development zones and oﬀered special
tax incentives to attract FDI. However, it is virtually impossible to have a
clear picture of how many provincial- or local-level development zones and
what kinds of special tax incentives there are in diﬀerent regions because there
are no complete statistics from publicly available informational sources. We
thus focus on the national-level zones.
Following Fung, Iizaka and Parker (2002), we adopt two dummy variables.
One (SEZD) takes value one if a region has either special economic zone or
open coastal city, and zero otherwise. The other one (ETDZD) takes value
one if a region has national economic and technological development zone,
and zero otherwise. By including these promotion policies, we are able to
control for the eﬀects of government incentive policies on FDI location choice
and at least partially distinguish between the eﬀects of regional institutional
strength and those of government promotion policies.
In the Appendix A2, we present summary statistics for our major regres-
sion variables.
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3 Results
To investigate the impacts of economic institutions on the location choice
of U.S. multinationals in China’s various regions, we use the discrete choice
model developed by McFadden (1974). The basic premise of the discrete
choice model is that the location chosen by a U.S. multinational firm must
oﬀer the highest profit over all other possible regions. Let πijt be the profit
firm i derives from setting up a manufacturing operation in region j at time
t. As discussed in Section 2.2, πijt is determined by a list of region j’s
characteristics at time t − 1, Xjt−1, including in particular the economic
institutions, and εijt is a disturbance term:
πijt = θ + β ·Xjt−1 + εijt.
The probability of firm i locating in region j is given by:
Pi(j) = Pr ob{πijt ≥ πikt} for all k 6= j
= Pr ob{θ + β ·Xjt−1 + εijt ≥ (θ + β ·Xkt−1 + εikt)} for all k 6= j
= Pr ob {εijt − εikt ≥ β(Xjt−1 −Xkt−1)} for all k 6= j
McFadden (1974) shows that, if and only if εijt follows Type I extreme
distribution, Pi(j) can be further simplified to the following logit expression:
Pi(j) =
eβ·Xjt−1P
k∈K e
β·Xkt−1
where K is the set of location choices faced by firm i. And it can then be
estimated by the conditional logit method, which has been used extensively in
the FDI location literature (e.g., Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee, 1991; Head,
Ries and Swenson, 1995). The conditional logit method estimates how each
regional characteristic increases or decreases the chances that a region will
be chosen rather than all other potential regions available for choice.
We analyze the importance of the four economic institution variables –
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Government Intervention in Busi-
ness Operations, Government Corruption, and Contract Enforcement - one
by one, with all the other variables included as control variables. Table 4
presents our main results when regressions are carried out using data from
the whole sample period 1993-2001. Intellectual Property Rights Protection
has a positive coeﬃcient with statistical significance level of 1%, while Gov-
ernment Intervention in Business Operations and Government Corruption
have negative coeﬃcients both at the 1% significance level. These results
show that U.S. multinationals prefer to invest in those regions of China that
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have a better protection of intellectual property rights, a lower degree of gov-
ernment intervention in business operations and a lower level of government
corruption, suggesting the importance of property rights protection in de-
termining the location of FDI.10 It is also found that Contract Enforcement
has a positive coeﬃcient with the 5% significance level, implying that the
better the contract enforcement of a region the more likely a U.S. multina-
tional may invest in that region. Taken together, our results further confirm
the main findings of the emerging economic institution literature that eco-
nomic institutions matter for investment incentive and economic performance
(See, among others, Besley, 1995; Mauro, 1995; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002).
Here our results highlight the impacts of economic institutions, including
property rights protection and contract enforcement, in determining the FDI
location.
We find that all the four control variables of agglomeration economies
generate positive and statistically significant impacts on the FDI location
choice of U.S. multinationals. This suggests that U.S. multinationals tend
to choose those regions where there are concentration of other U.S. firms
engaged in the same industry, clustering of China’s indigenous firms of the
same industry, and wide market and supplier access. It is interesting that the
positive impact of agglomeration of China’s indigenous firms is much larger
than that of U.S. multinationals: if the agglomeration of China’s indigenous
firms increases 1%, it raises the probability of investment of U.S. multina-
tionals by 3.01%, while a 1% rise in the agglomeration of U.S. multinationals
boosts the chances of investment of U.S. multinationals by 1.53%.11 This is
in contrast to the result of Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) that, when in-
vesting in the United States, the Japanese multinationals care more about
the clustering of fellow Japanese firms than that of American firms. Also in-
terestingly, the eﬀects of backward agglomeration (supplier access) are much
larger than those of forward agglomeration (market access) on the location
choice of U.S. multinationals: It can be calculated that a 1% increment in
the ratio of the backward agglomeration indicator will push up the chances
of investment of U.S. multinationals by 11.37%, whereas the same increment
in the forward agglomeration indicator will raise the probability by 6.43%.
10It should be pointed out that, while government intervention in business operations
could be a second-best substitute for the lack of formal institutions, it is found to be
negative for U.S. multinationals as they are bound by law from bribing government oﬃcials.
11The eﬀects of agglomeration are calculated based on the average of the estimated
coeﬃcients of the relevant explanatory variable in regressions 1, 2 and 4 of Table 4. The
estimated coeﬃcients in regression 3 are not used because of the much smaller sample size
in that regression.
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This suggests that supplier access is more important in attracting U.S. firms
than market access does.12
The other control variables for regional characteristics all exhibit results
consistent with both theoretical predictions and existing findings in the litera-
ture. Regional average wage rate has a negative eﬀect on U.S. firm entry; this
reveals the labor cost eﬀects in U.S. firm location choice. Highway density in
a region promotes U.S. firm entry, suggesting that basic infrastructure is one
essential factor in luring FDI. Human capital endowment reflected in higher
education enrollment also boosts U.S. FDI. This is not surprising because
U.S. FDI tends to involve a high level of technology. This is also consistent
with the findings of Fung, Iizaka and Parker (2002) and Gao (2005) that
regional labor quality significantly aﬀects regional aggregate FDI flows from
developed countries including the United States. As expected, the existence
of U.S. embassy or consulates facilitates U.S. FDI, as it provides more chan-
nels of information sharing. The national government promotion policies
produce the expected positive and significant impact on U.S. firm entry.
To test the robustness of our results on economic institutions, we use
the alternative measures of Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Govern-
ment Intervention in Business Operations, and Contract Enforcement from
Fan-Wang-Zhu’s (2003) China Regional Marketization Indices as described
in Section 2.2. Table 5 summarizes the main results of the regressions that
are restricted to the subsample 1998-2001 because of the limited availabil-
ity of the Fan-Wang-Zhu indices. We find that all these three alternative
measures of economic institutions have the same qualitative results as in our
main regressions (Table 4). The results for the control variables are also sim-
ilar to those of Table 4, except that the horizontal agglomeration of China’s
indigenous firms no longer exhibits a larger impact than that of U.S. multi-
nationals. Actually the magnitude of the former eﬀect is a bit smaller than
the latter one. However, the backward agglomeration still exerts a positive
impact of a larger magnitude than the forward agglomeration does. Other
regional characteristics variables present qualitatively equivalent results as in
Table 4. In summary, our main results on economic institutions are robust
to the alternative measures of the strength of economic institutions.
4 Conclusion
Foreign direct investment by multinationals of developed countries has been
shown to be important for transition economies as well as developing economies,
12Amiti and Javorcik (2007) find that the supplier access and market access have sinilar
impacts on the changes of FDI flows of China’s regions.
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for it brings capital, advanced technologies and management know-how. This
is especially the case in China, as its transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market economy has been driven by its open-door policy (i.e.,
opening to foreign trade and investment) since 1978. Indeed, many of these
developing countries or transition economies have been trying to attract for-
eign direct investment, mostly through tax incentives.
This paper, however, focuses on the importance of economic institutions
in attracting FDI by multinationals. Using a data set of 6,288 U.S. multi-
nationals investing in various regions in China for the period of 1993-2001,
we find that U.S. multinationals prefer to invest in those regions that have
better protection of intellectual property rights, a lower degree of government
intervention in business operations, a lower level of government corruption,
and better contract enforcement. Compared with some cross-country stud-
ies of the impacts of economic institutions on FDI, our study avoids the
problem of controlling for the diﬀerences in political system, culture and
language, corporate tax policies, and national trade and investment policies
across countries. Our data set of firms from the same source country has
also help us to avoid the complexity coming from the possible interactions
between the identity of foreign investors and local economic institutions.
Our results on the importance of economic institutions for FDI are ro-
bust to alternative measures of economic institutions, and to the inclusion
of control variables such as those for agglomeration economies, and other
traditional factors of FDI location choice. They have policy implications for
transition economies as well as developing countries: strengthening economic
institutions is one central precondition for attracting FDI inflow.
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Table 1: Entry of U.S. Manufacturing Multinationals into China by Year 
 
YEAR 
Number 
of New 
Entry 
Accumulated 
Number of Entry 
1982 3 3
1983 2 5
1984 6 11
1985 17 28
1986 20 48
1987 25 73
1988 58 131
1989 68 199
1990 88 287
1991 205 492
1992 735 1227
1993 1170 2397
1994 751 3148
1995 890 4038
1996 599 4637
1997 624 5261
1998 709 5970
1999 709 6679
2000 13 6692
2001 829 7521
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Table 2: Geographic Distribution of Investment by U.S. Manufacturing 
Multinationals in China (Year 2001) 
 
Region Number Percentage Region Number Percentage 
Beijing  594 7.90 Henan  133 1.77 
Tianjin  401 5.33 Hubei  126 1.68 
Hebei 275 3.66 Hunan  71 0.94 
Shanxi  71 0.94 Guangdong 650 8.64 
Inner Mongolia 56 0.74 Guangxi 57 0.76 
Liaoning 506 6.73 Hainan  13 0.17 
Jilin  92 1.22 Sichuan  179 2.38 
Heilongjiang  100 1.33 Guizhou  24 0.32 
Shanghai  989 13.15 Yunnan  43 0.57 
Jiangsu  1143 15.20 Shaanxi  96 1.28 
Zhejiang  657 8.74 Gansu  23 0.31 
Anhui  151 2.01 Qinghai  4 0.05 
Fujian  154 2.05 Ningxia 10 0.13 
Jiangxi  53 0.70 Xinjiang 23 0.31 
Shandong  827 11.00       
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Table 3: Indices of Economic Institutions in China’s Regions (Year 2000) 
 
Region 
Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Protection 
Government Intervention 
in Business Operations Government Corruption Contract Enforcement 
Beijing 1.45 0.10 0.65 0.24 
Tianjin 0.48 0.11 0.67 0.17 
Hebei -0.87 0.06 0.54 0.22 
Shanxi -1.23 0.02 0.62 0.10 
Inner Mongolia -1.12 0.04 0.56 0.28 
Liaoning 0.13 0.09 0.63 0.18 
Jilin -0.50 0.10 0.76 0.10 
Heilongjiang -0.49 0.08 0.65 0.20 
Shanghai 0.88 0.07 0.37 0.25 
Jiangsu -0.15 0.11 0.44 0.23 
Zhejiang 0.47 0.10 0.45 0.22 
Anhui -1.40 0.15 0.63 0.29 
Fujian -0.14 0.10 0.51 0.33 
Jiangxi -1.35 0.07 0.54 0.20 
Shandong -0.27 0.05 0.52 0.32 
Henan -1.21 0.04 0.52 0.15 
Hubei -1.01 0.17 0.39 0.16 
Hunan -0.92 0.08 0.70 0.30 
Guangdong 0.60 0.05 0.60 0.22 
Guangxi -1.33 0.14 0.55 0.23 
Hainan -0.90 0.14 0.81 0.26 
Sichuan -0.96 0.13 0.68 0.27 
Guizhou -1.60 0.18 0.88 0.27 
Yunnan -1.26 0.10 0.59 0.31 
Shaanxi -0.90 0.09 0.47 0.23 
Gansu -1.65 0.10 0.67 0.41 
Qinghai -1.49 0.00 0.45 0.30 
Ningxia -0.92 0.08 0.45 0.17 
Xinjiang -0.99 0.14 0.59 0.35 
Table 4: Economic Institutions and FDI Location Choice 
(Main Regression Results) 
 1 2 3a 4 
Economic Institutions   
Intellectual Property 
Right Protection 
0.344*** 
(0.036)   
 
Government Intervention in 
Business Operations  
-3.597*** 
(0.588)  
 
Government Corruption   -1.691*** (0.244) 
 
Contract Enforcement    0.784** (0.337) 
Agglomeration   
Agglomeration US 1.598***(0.091)
1.584***
(0.092)
2.736***
(0.187)
1.582*** 
(0.092) 
Agglomeration Domestic 2.974***(0.219)
3.094***
(0.220)
2.679***
(0.355)
3.121*** 
(0.220) 
Backward Agglomeration 11.061***(0.845)
11.932***
(0.844)
9.042***
(1.425)
11.778*** 
(0.845) 
Forward Agglomeration 5.398***(0.763)
6.406***
(0.754)
6.180***
(1.202)
6.657*** 
(0.752) 
Other Controlled Variables   
Wage -1.115***(0.086)
-1.030***
(0.086)
-1.260***
(0.145)
-1.066*** 
(0.056) 
Infrastructure 0.474***(0.042)
0.589***
(0.040)
0.563***
(0.065)
0.630*** 
(0.040) 
Education 0.201***(0.041)
0.436***
(0.030)
0.367***
(0.063)
0.482** 
(0.029) 
Presence of US embassy or 
consulates 
0.329***
(0.038)
0.400***
(0.038)
0.627***
(0.067)
0.379*** 
(0.038) 
SEZD 0.538***(0.043)
0.496***
(0.045)
0.590***
(0.070)
0.540*** 
(0.044) 
ETDZD 0.223***(0.050)
0.294***
(0.051)
0.296***
(0.087)
0.260*** 
(0.050) 
No. of choosers 6,288 6,288 2,259 6,288 
No. of choices 29 29 29 29 
Pseudo R2 0.1881 0.1868 0.2075 0.1860 
LR chi2(11) 7965.75 7909.57 3156.72 7876.84 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
a The number of choosers on the corruption index regression is reduced to 1998-2001 due to the availability of the index.  
Table 5: Economic Institutions and FDI Location Choice 
(Robustness Check) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
 1 2 3 
Economic Institutions 
Intellectual Property 
Right Protection 
0.016*
(0.010  
Government Intervention 
in Business Operations 
0.026**
(0.012)  
Contract Enforcement 0.093*** (0.021) 
Agglomeration 
Agglomeration US 2.925***(0.186)
2.894***
(0.186)
2.760*** 
(0.189) 
Agglomeration Domestic 2.524***(0.356)
2.618***
(0.356)
2.616*** 
(0.356) 
Backward Agglomeration 10.836***(1.389)
10.258***
(1.409)
10.660*** 
(1.397) 
Forward Agglomeration 6.578***(1.198)
6.534***
(1.197)
7.531*** 
(1.200) 
Other Controlled Variables 
Wage -1.052***(0.142)
-1.001***
(0.142)
-1.330*** 
(0.158) 
Infrastructure 0.509***(0.064)
0.505***
(0.065)
0.416*** 
(0.067) 
Education 0.430***(0.063)
0.424***
(0.062)
0.160* 
(0.083) 
Presence of US embassy or 
consulates 
0.470***
(0.065)
0.443***
(0.069)
0.546*** 
(0.064) 
SEZD 0.671***(0.070)
0.671***
(0.070)
0.799*** 
(0.075) 
ETDZD 0.141***(0.087)
0.145***
(0.086)
0.197** 
(0.086) 
No. of choosers 2,259 2,259 2,259 
No. of choices 29 29 29 
Pseudo R2 0.2045 0.2046 0.2056 
LR chi2(11) 3110.93 3112.46 3128.33 
Appendix A1: Description of Other Control Variables for Regional Characteristics in China 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
Wage the logarithm of the average manufacturing wage (Unit: Yuan) China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
Infrastructure the logarithm of the highway density (Unit: km/sq. km) China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
Education the logarithm of the ratio of employment with college degree or above China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
Presence of US embassy or 
consulates 
a dummy variable which equals one when the region has the US embassy or 
consulates 
History of the diplomatic establishment between China and 
United States 1786-1994, Huang Gang, 1995 Taiwan 
SEZD a dummy variable which equals one when the region has a special economic zone* or an open coastal city** 
Comprehensive statistical data and materials on 50 years of  
New China 1949-1999, National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 1999 
ETDZD 
  
a dummy variable which equals one when the region has an economic and  
technological development zone*** Ministry of Commerce of China 
* Special economic zones: Zhuhai, Shenzhen, and Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, and Hainan Province. 
**Open coastal cities: Tianjin, Qinghuangdao in Hebei Province, Dalian in Liaoning Province, Shanghai, Lianyungang and Nantong in Jiangsu Province, Ningbo and Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, Fuzhou in Fujian 
Province, Yantai and Tsingtao in Shandong Province, Guangzhou and Zhanjiang in Guangdong Province, and Beihai in Guangxi Province.   
***Economic and Technological Development Zones: Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghuangdao in Hebei Province,  Dalian, Yinkou and Shenyang in Liaoning Province, Changchun in Jilin Province, Harbin in Heilongjiang Province, 
Shanghai, Lianyungang, Nantong, and Kunshan in Jiangsu Province, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo Daxie, and Xiaoshan in Zhejiang Province, Wuhu and Hefei in Anhui Province, Fuzhou, Xiamen Haicang, Fuqing 
Rongqiao, and Dongshan in Fujian Province, Nanchang in Jiangxi Province, Tsingtao, Yantai and Weihai in Shandong Province, Zhengzhou in Henan Province, Wuhan in Hubei Province, Changsha in Hunan Province, 
Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou Nansha and HuiZhou Dayawan in Guangdong Province, Hainan Yanpu in Hainan Province, Chongqing and Chengdu in Sichuan Province, Guiyang in Guizhou Province, Kunming in 
Yunnan Province, Xi’an in Shaanxi Province, Xining in Qinghai Province, and Urumuqi and Shihezi in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. 
 
Appendix A2: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Economic Institutions  
Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection -1.152 0.897 -2.905 1.653
Government Intervention in Business 
Operations 0.045 0.039 0 0.181
Government Corruption 0.573 0.116 0.333 0.879
Contract Enforcement 0.117 0.083 0.022 0.500
Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection (Fan-Wang-Zhu’s index) 1.833 2.117 0 11.77
Government Intervention in Business 
Operations (Fan-Wang-Zhu’s index) 6.181 2.688 0 10
Contract Enforcement (Fan-Wang-Zhu’s 
index) 2.322 2.284 0 11.39
Agglomeration  
Agglomeration US 0.0332 0.0833 0 1
Agglomeration Domestic 0.0343 0.0508 0 1
Backward Agglomeration 0.0188 0.0200 0.0000602 0.271
Forward Agglomeration 0.0255 0.0247 0.0000206 0.364
Other Controlled Variables 
Wage 8.456 0.430 7.681 9.752
Infrastructure -1.595 0.845 -4.159 -0.212
Education 1.001 0.660 -0.223 3.135
Presence of US embassy or consulates 0.172 0.378 0 1
SEZD 0.375 0.484 0 1
ETDZD 0.529 0.499 0 1
